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To correctly understand why companies make charitable donations, I utilize text-based machine learning 
technique on news articles to identify underlying topics on what is intended by the firm when making 
charitable donations. Using topic modeling machine learning technique on article text, I identify four 
topics of donation, Altruism, Managerial Benefit, Community, and Publicity, and test hypotheses on 
different possible motives for donations that could be distinguished through topics identified. With the 
test, I find that cover-up motive and business reputation motive are main drivers of corporate charitable 
donation. Moreover, I also find that corporate charitable donation is associated with higher profit, reduced 
information asymmetry, and lower risk. Evidences from tests reveal that corporate charitable donation is 
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Abstract: To correctly understand why companies make charitable donations, I utilize text-based 
machine learning technique on news articles to identify underlying topics on what is intended by 
the firm when making charitable donations. Using topic modeling machine learning technique on 
article text, I identify four topics of donation, Altruism, Managerial Benefit, Community, and 
Publicity, and test hypotheses on different possible motives for donations that could be 
distinguished through topics identified. With the test, I find that cover-up motive and business 
reputation motive are main drivers of corporate charitable donation. Moreover, I also find that 
corporate charitable donation is associated with higher profit, reduced information asymmetry, and 
lower risk. Evidences from tests reveal that corporate charitable donation is mainly motivated by 




In recent years, with the rise of interest on Corporate’s Social Responsibility (CSR), “Green 
Investment”, and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) dimension of public corporations, 
both investors and managers have begun to initiate CSR-ESG related business endeavors or 
revamp their existing CSR strategies to meet investor’s demand. 1  In the process, charitable 
donation has been chosen as relatively easy, but dedicated form of strategy for expressing CSR 
effort. Such increased attention resulted in overall increase in the charitable donation made by the 
corporations and corporate-related foundation entities (Chart 1). 
However, despite both prolonged practice and increased attention on company’s donating 
behavior, little is known about why firms would be motivated to make charitable donations or 
what may drive the firms to make charitable donations, let alone any potential impact on the firms. 
While many researchers have attempt to answer the question of why firms would make charitable 
donations, understanding of the true motives has been difficult for two following reasons. First, 
the data on corporate practice of charitable donation has not been readily available, resulting in 
fairly small sample for any reliable statistical inference. Second, the observed practices of donation 
behavior by the firm have been too diverse and thus complicated for any single motivation could 
explain, while the outcome of these different possible motivations is simply more or less donations. 
While donating companies provide altruism as a reason, there are cases where the contribution had 
made to influence certain group, to seek publicity or to cover up some misdeeds, or for executives 
to possibly gain private benefit through networking made available through donation. Such 
 
1 In 2019, CEO’s of Business Roundtable redefined the goal of corporation to be stakeholder value maximization. Meanwhile, 
asset under management (AUM) by ESG related delegated funds has increased from $2 billion in 2012 to over $14 billion in 
2020, a seven-fold increase in 8 years (US SIF Foundation). Moreover, corporations have begun to add new position called 
“Chief Sustainability Officer” who overlooks the CSR aspect of the business, recording 35 new hires among S&P 500 firms in 




complexity in practice and lack of data have altogether made the understanding motivation for 
corporate charitable donation difficult, leaving questions on whether it should be encouraged, 
prohibited, or controlled. All these questions would be difficult to answer without systematic 
evidence on well-defined motives of charitable donations that is founded on content-based analysis.  
In this study, I provide a large-scale evidence of what motives may drive the firms to 
engage in charitable donation. To answer this question, I first compile a novel dataset on firm’s 
corporate donations behaviors using online news articles from 2000 to 2020 and identify 
underlying topics of the stated reasons of charitable donations mentioned in news article using 
topic modeling machine learning technique on the textual data. As firms tend to use lengthy 
descriptions in delivering news on corporate donations, simple categorization based on recipients 
may introduce a possibility of misclassification or wrong interpretation of what motivation drives 
donation decision. To address this issue, I employ guided Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
method that allows the detection of own semantic relationship while allowing the researcher to 
prespecify a certain number of topics for interpretability. With guided LDA technique, I identify 
four different topics within the textual data of charitable donations of the companies, Altruism, 
Community, Managerial Benefit, and Publicity, and find that donations with Managerial Benefit 
and Publicity dominate.  To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical research that 
systematically analyze the contents of the news on corporation’s charitable donations activities to 
infer underlying motives. With this approach, two major challenges in understanding the motives 
of donation are addressed, as using news articles as source of data solves the lack of large sample 
issue that other studies have failed to address, while using machine learning technique helps 




One possible issue with inferring the motivation outright from the news article text data is 
that the information that may be revealed through topic modeling is still a stated reason or purpose, 
which may not always reflect the true motivation of the firm. Therefore, to gain further 
understanding and infer the behind motivation of firm’s charitable donations, I propose four 
different hypotheses on the motivation of charitable donation that may affect the donations of 
different topic differently. Using different measures for testing, I find that firms are motivated to 
use charitable donation as a tool to cover up bad reputations from its misdeeds, and sometimes for 
business reasons to increase awareness of the customers. I also find the donation decision to be a 
result of strategic decision from management but is not a result of personal fulfillment or 
governance failure of the company. Finally, I test to see whether the act of charitable donation has 
any effect on the firm-level financial outcome of the donating company. While the effect could be 
small, I find positive association between corporate charitable donation with higher profitability, 
reduced information asymmetry, and lower risk for some of the topics with the donation.   
This is not the first study that examines the motivation of donations. Many existing studies 
also attempted to identify the possible motives of corporate charitable donations (Patten (2007), 
Su and He (2010), Wang and Qian (2011), El Ghoul et al. (2011), Masulis and Reza (2015), Cahan 
et al. (2015)). However, one common shortcoming is that in uncovering the possible motivation, 
these studies only examine the donation amount as the single outcome that may be determined at 
firm level without considering certain topics that may dominate the donations making of the 
company. Some of these studies have failed to find the relationship documented in this study and 
it could be attributed to the fact that in the process of evaluating certain motivation, the opposing 
effects coming from different topics of donation may have cancelled each other out, providing 




 The rest of the paper is as follows. I first describe how the news article data has been 
collected and processed for the analysis in Section 2. In Section 3, I described the process of topic 
modeling technique and result of topic model analysis on the data. To gain further understanding, 
I develop testable hypotheses using the topics of charitable donation identified in Section 4. In 




2. Data  
To first understand what companies state as the motivation or reason for making charitable 
donation publicly, I analyze the text in the news article published online as a source of information. 
To obtain the news articles on the philanthropic donation of US domestic firms, I utilize Google 
News API library published for Python to search relevant news articles related to corporate 
philanthropy. The advantage of the Google News library is that it allows the user to access the 
same set of tools and filters as if you would use the regular Google News search page on Python. 
I choose Google algorithm over other media news database such as Lexis Nexis because 1) I want 
to encompass more diverse set of news outlet in addition to traditional ones that the general public 
may have more closer access to, and 2) it is technically easier to obtain the full text of the article 
through web scraping algorithm. The drawback to this approach is that the obtained text requires 
more cleaning.  
To establish the dataset, I first obtain the names of public corporations that appear in 
Compustat database from 2000 to 2020. I first use the exchange code (EXCHG) to keep all stocks 
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on NYSE and NASDAQ and drop all exchange traded funds (ETF’s) by searching for names 
associated with funds (ETF, Value, Growth, Treasury, Return, REIT, Equity Shares, etc.) using 
their names. I identify a total of 4,811 public company names and employ into the search by 
restricting the exact name to appear in the news article using Google search tool. If the name of 
the company is generic (e.g. Target), I use the full name (e.g. Target Corporation) instead for more 
accurate search. To collect the news article relevant to the corporate philanthropy and donations, 
I employ keywords relevant to corporate philanthropy, charitable donation, and corporate donation 
along with the name of the company. Double quotation around the company name with conditional 
searches using Boolean functions forcing these terms to be included enables more exact search.  
As Google News search algorithm generates some search results that are less pertinent to 
the keywords, after the initial search result is obtained, I further filter out irrelevant results that 
does not contain any relevant description about the company I searched for. After making sure the 
article is about the company, I apply another around of filter for filtering any news not related to 
corporate charitable donation to ensure most relevant pool for data analysis. For the first round of 
raw search, I obtain more than 380,000 search results periods between 2000 to 2020. After the first 
filtering, I am left with 285,184 news articles related to the companies in the list. After filtering 
for charitable donations activities, I am left with 166,770 number of articles that pertain to firm’s 
donation activities. After dropping articles that do not specify or mention any dollar amount of 
donation and matching with the current data on corporate charitable donation, I end up with 
100,309 news articles that contain information on the amount of philanthropic donation made by 
the firm. To match the article with the respective company profile, I use the name matching 




In addition to the dataset from news article, I also establish another dataset of charitable 
donation to cross-check the amount from news article. I collect charitable donation data through 
Foundation Center, a database vendor which collects and digitizes the tax exemption filing forms 
that are submitted to Internal Revenue Service annually. This filing is available to public upon 
request to IRS, and Foundation Center digitizes the report for easier searching of fundraising for 
various parties in need. Every organization that operates with non-profit status is required to submit 
Form 990/990 P-F, which contains various financial information of the non-profit organization. 
The filing contains detailed financial information such as how much the organization has received 
as an income, its investment income, notable expense like salary of important officers, and how 
much of grant has been made to specific organizations for the given tax year. The information 
provided through this outlet enables me to validate some of the charitable donations from news 
articles.2 I manually collect the digitized data from tax filing report by visiting Foundation Center’s 
physical office location and public libraries with data terminal. The Center provides the digitized 
version of the data from 2003 until 2017, and the coverage is limited to companies in S&P 500 
index. Due to this limit, after matching the data to Compustat data for firm-level financial 
information, there are 3,227 firm-year observation with 453 companies. I use this dataset mainly 
for robustness check.  
 
 
3. Machine Learning on Topic Model: Guided Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
A. Regular Latent Dirichlet Allocation  
 
2 While some matches are possible, donations reported in the news article and the donation information from tax filing do not 
always coincide, as the timing and format of the payment is not stated in the news article. Depending on how the contribution is 
made, it could be reported as different amount at different point in time. 
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To understand different underlying motives for making donations, I utilize the variation of Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) technique called Guided LDA to determine most likely topics from 
what firms state as why they make charitable donations. LDA is an unsupervised Bayesian 
machine learning technique that infers the set of topics based on collection of words found in the 
documents by assuming that document follows a certain generating structure. In other words, LDA 
tries to answer what “latent” structure of topics would have likely generated the collection of words 
observed in the document of interest (refer to Appendix 1 for illustration of data structure). LDA 
is a powerful technique when the researcher is interested in identifying the overarching topic 
hidden in the collection of documents that may contain certain topic in not readily noticeable ways. 
One of the benefits of regular LDA technique is that there is no prescreening or training required 
for the algorithm to generate its own topic, nor does the researcher need any prior on what the 
topics should be. However, researcher should have a fairly good idea on the number of possible 
topics within the document, as the number of topics is one of the key inputs to the model. 
While the original unsupervised LDA is efficient in detecting plausible topics that reflect 
the underlying ideas with a group of keywords for a given document, one drawback to 
unsupervised learning is that the algorithm may generate the group of words for certain topic 
representation that may not necessarily guarantee human interpretability. That is, the unsupervised 
learning of regular LDA model may not always come up with a group of words that can be 
recognized into broader set of idea that we can refer to as a legitimate topic that may surface from 
the collection of documents. Rather, what has been generated as a topic could be a jumble of words 
that cannot be reasonably categorized as broader topic that is pertinent to the textual data being 
analyzed. Therefore, with unsupervised LDA, even after the group of word for a certain topic is 
generated, researcher’s discretion must come in to determine what the group of word represents as 
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the broader topic. In addition, if the new document of interest for analysis contains words that the 
model’s training set did not contain, the unsupervised model is not capable of assigning meaningful 
probabilities that may alter the topic allocation. Therefore, while LDA is highly effective in 
generating underlying topic of interest, analyzing new set of documents with already trained LDA 
model does not produce as effective result in identifying underlying topics. Another shortcoming 
with LDA is that the number of topics for the machine analysis has to be predetermined as an input 
to the model. While it is possible that the researcher may be able to predict and determine a 
reasonable number of topics, it is not always the case that the number of topics chosen is sufficient 
or not.  
 
B. Guided Latent Dirichlet Allocation and Topic Selection 
To address two shortcomings of regular LDA topic analysis technique, in this study, I 
employ Guided LDA (GLDA) technique devised by Jagarlamundi et al. (2012) that helps the 
interpretability of the topic and versatility of the model with documents with potentially diverse 
topic. Unlike regular or unguided LDA, GLDA trains the model with an input that predetermines 
the word’s affiliation to specific topic for the model. This is done by providing a “guidance” matrix 
(commonly referred as Eta) that contains a group of word that the researcher believes each topic 
should identify as an input to the model. Because set of words that specifically indicate certain 
topic are included as part of the input to the model, the resulting topic from learning guarantees 
the interpretability of the topic. This matrix does not strictly impose the topic selection, but simply 
provides a “nudge” toward assigning certainty probability to the likelihood of word coming from 
certain topic for the specific group of words chosen by the researcher. For the rest of the word 
occurrences, the model trains the same the regular LDA, so guidance matrix does not influence the 
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model to alter existing sematic relationship among words present in the document. This helps 
identify the semantic relationships of the words among topics within the model more coherently 
(interpretability), while remaining flexible to incorporate any new possible words to be associated 
with the predetermined topic (versatility).3  
The benefit of Guided LDA is that the researcher could generate relevant topics that seem 
coherent with the document of analytic interest. Because the researcher can assign certain words 
into the predetermined numbers of topics, he/she could implement theoretical understanding and 
foundation into the model and have reasonable expectation each topic generated from the model 
should represent, while also letting the model to depict what the latent structure of the sematic 
relationship the data has.  Therefore, unlike the regular LDA where the topic generated may be 
irrelevant or uninterpretable with human understanding, the researcher could generate a more 
cohesive model that produces relevant topics of which the documents of interest may contain. 
However, this is not a supervised learning, as there is no pre-determined condition that the data 
should meet to be identified as one of the categories and the model could also determine other 
possible set of sematic relationship observed in the data but not specified in the guidance matrix. 
The task of choosing the number of topic and deciding what dominant idea and words to 
include for each topic remains to be an important task, especially for GLDA. Whereas only the 
number of topics is important for the unguided LDA, guided LDA also requires the corpora of 
words that need to be included in the guidance matrix. If the researcher has predetermined theory 
or idea on what the topics from the textual data should be about and has well-defined sets of words 
describing the topic of interest, one can set up the model to fully incorporate the number of topics 
and the set of corpora that represents the idea appropriately. However, because there is no 
 
3 Please refer to Toubia, Iyengar, Bunnell, and Lemaire (2019) for step-by-step description of how Guided LDA trains the model. 
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guarantee that the theory chosen would be the best structure that may represent the data, a measure 
called Coherence Score is accompanied to cross-check whether the number of topics selected for 
the model numerically best represents the given data. For this paper, I select the model’s topic 
based on previous literatures on corporate charitable donations. Unlike philanthropic donations 
made by non-profit organizations or governments who provide social benefits at no cost, 
companies are profit-maximizing agent that cannot put business considerations aside even for 
charitable actions (Porter and Kramer (2002)). Therefore, in addition to corporate charitable 
donations that may pertain to altruism or contributions to communities, donations pertaining to 
marketing effort and publicity could also appear as a potential topic. As charitable donations serve 
philanthropic purpose, donation out of altruism and to community where potential stakeholders 
may be influenced could be one dominant idea found in the news articles. Therefore, I select 
Altruism and Community as potential topics that may be able to detect and classify various 
donations made in such natures. Also, as documented in marketing and management literatures, 
since the main direct way in which the firm could use charitable donation for business purpose is 
in the form of strategic marketing initiative that publicizes the socially responsible behavior of the 
firm, I select Publicity as one of the potential topics. In addition, since there are types of donations 
that have been engaged with expectation of gaining personal reputation and networking benefits 
by managers or the directors in the managing group (Benabou and Tirole (2006)), I also select 
Managerial Benefit as one of the possible topics that can be detected in the news article data that 
may help us understand the observed corporate charitable donation behavior and test the 
hypotheses on the behind motivations of donating behavior. In short, I choose Altruism, 
Community, Publicity, and Managerial Benefit as predetermined topics for training the guided 




C. Implementation of Guided LDA 
To implement the guided LDA to the data collected on the charitable donation, I first compile the 
guidance matrix that will be used as part of the input for the model analysis. While we know what 
the topics for the guidance matrix should be, as the corpus for charitable donations and 
philanthropic activities of corporations are not readily available, I compile the set of words from 
the news article dataset itself. To first obtain the set of words to be included for guidance matrix, 
I first choose the set of news article that may contain topics related to charitable donation with 
meaningful amount of description in the article. To introduce randomness in the selection of article, 
I first divide the news article in groups of 1,000 for easier manual scanning and select total of 150 
articles, after manually screening them to ensure they contain enough text materials for meaningful 
analysis. While this is not completely randomized process, this is to ensure reduction of any bias 
while maintaining coherence on the set of vocabularies I include in the guidance matrix. On this 
initial set of news articles, I first run unsupervised LDA to discern possible set of words that could 
be included for each topic of choice I am interested in evaluating. After obtaining initial corpus, I 
add more words to ensure each topic of interest reflect the indicated topics accordingly. The list of 
words compiled for the guidance matrix is listed in Appendix 2. As I am interested in disentangling 
motives into four different main categories, I set up the matrix so that the model would produce 
four different topics. Because determining the number of topics in and LDA analysis is arbitrary, 
I attempt to establish the number of topics based on previous studies that have studied the 
motivations for charitable donation of the corporation. One topic of charitable donation that 
received continuous attention is altruism of corporation. As they elicit some facets of why 
corporation is making charitable donations, I believe incorporating them into four large main 
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topics will not only facilitate further understanding of the motivation, but also provide an 
opportunity to evaluate the set of possible motives that explain the observed charitable donation 
behavior by corporations. 
After the identifying the guidance matrix, I train the guided LDA model using entire news 
article data available using established guidance matrix as an input to the model. Lastly, with the 
trained model, I apply the model to analyzing the likelihood that the text of article is from one of 
the four topics with respect to the company’s donating activities. From this process, what results 
is the relative percentage of topic likelihood of each article that adds up to one. In other words, 
LDA ultimately assigns a certain probability that the content of an article is likely from the topics 
identified. To classify articles into one of the specific topics, I identify the article to be of one 
specific topic that has the highest relative topic percentage.  
 
D. Results of Guided LDA model 
Chart 2 shows the overall topic distribution of the news article on philanthropic donation. Contrary 
to general expectation, that most prevalent topic that can be detected is not altruistic dimension in 
the philanthropy of corporations. Instead, topic pertaining to possible managerial benefit 
constitutes as the most dominant motives for making philanthropic donations while publicity topic 
constitutes another important dimension reflected in the news article. While community related 
charitable donation activity does constitute as one important body of the topics, the dominance of 
topics that are related to corporate activity suggests that corporate charitable donations are 
motivated with some degree of business concerns, be it for the benefit of the managers or for the 
donating company.  
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Chart 3 presents with the top 10 keywords that have the most semantic importance within 
each topic. Altruism, Community, and Publicity topics determined seem to contain set of words 
that are relevant to the topics intended with the guidance matrix. For Managerial Benefit, as many 
corporate charitable donations that are made to universities and education entities are known to 
benefit the private network of the directors (Cai, Xu, and Yang (2017)), it seems acceptable that 
the topic assigned for managerial benefit shows set of words that pertains to education. Moreover, 
since media coverage on donations made to universities often receive name recognitions that 
specify the name of the executive officers or the title, the resulting cluster of words seem probable.  
To test whether the number of topics used for guidance matrix is appropriate and best 
explains the data, I calculate coherence score 4  of the LDA model derived. Coherence score 
measures the semantic similarity across different topics from the given distribution of corpus, or 
probabilities that a certain group of text would appear in coherent measure given the number of 
topics in the documents. Therefore, comparing coherence score with different number of topics in 
LDA method provides understanding whether having different number of topics affects the 
efficacy of topic representation of the overall observed word appearance frequencies that must 
have some latent sematic relationships. To calculate the score, LDA model is run with different 
number of topics and calculate the score for each estimated model. Chart 4 shows the topic 
coherence score for the number of topics chosen for each analysis. Higher score implies that the 
chosen number of topics explains the data better. Empirically, a coherence score of 0.4 means 
insufficient number of topics, and 0.55 is considered as realistically achievable score that best 
explains the data. A coherence score of 0.65 is considered ideal but higher than 0.7 suggests that 
 
4 Coherence Score measure for testing whether the number of topics for LDA properly describes the data is devised by Newman, 
Lau, Grieser, and Baldwin (2010) in “Automatic Evaluation of Topic Coherence”, where the methodology was first devised and 
introduced for testing.  
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the model is flawed. With the current Guided LDA model, the coherence score result of 0.54 
suggests that having four number of topics for the model best explains the data being analyzed. 
While the performance of the model deteriorates for topics more than 4, it slowly improves up to 
16 number of topics and deteriorates even further past 16. Coherence score test result justifies 
those 4 topics are needed to better understand the latent structure of news article data on corporate 
charitable donations.  
Summary statistics for the donations amount identified in the news article is provided in 
Table 1. As extensively discussed in the Data section, after applying various filters on requirements 
of the data, I end up with 100,309 observations that have text related to corporate’s charitable 
donation activity with dollar amount specified that is also retrievable by the scraping algorithm. 
On average, the firms who publicize their charitable donation activity donate or pledge to 
contribute around 7.27 million dollars. With the identified topic, firms are likely to donate on 
managerial benefit topic with the most amount, followed by donation on publicity, community, 
and altruism. From this initial analysis, it is evident that the donation efforts are concentrated on 
managerial benefit topic and publicity topic, hinting that corporate charitable donation is generally 
rather focused on business related topics than showing true philanthropy.  
Industry breakdown on charitable donation within the sample confirms many previous 
findings about the overall practice of corporate giving. Previous studies have found that the more 
homogenous the product is and the closer to the end customer, the higher the overall contribution 
is made to the public. In line with this finding, I observe higher amount of donation for companies 
in financial industry (homogenous products) and companies in manufacturing and business 
equipment (customers). In addition, other studies have reveals that what is traditionally considered 
as more threat to environment tend to make mending donations. Also, in line with the previous 
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documentation, I find higher amount of donation being made by firms in oil, gas, and coal industry, 
and also companies in utility industry. Overall, the sample data collected shows tendencies that 
are in line with what previous literatures have documented, validating the dataset.  
 
 
4. Hypothesis Development 
 
With the topics identified with guided LDA, I turn to building more formal hypotheses on why 
firms may be motivated to make donations specific to different topics identified in the analysis. 
Understanding the underlying motives of corporate charitable donation has been a topic of great 
interest to economic researchers, as no single motivation would sufficiently explain the 
transferring of financial resource without any return for a profit-maximizing agent. While many 
research works have been documented for the possible motives, majority of the literatures that 
attempt to explain the motivation have based its theoretical foundation on the argument proposed 
by Friedman (1970) that the sole “social responsibility of the business” is to maximize profit and 
thus shareholder’s value. To test this idea, economists have examined the financial outcome of 
making corporate charitable donations. They hypothesized that if there exists a positive 
relationship between the charitable donation and financial performance of the donating firm, then 
the financial benefit should be the main motive of charitable donation, finding alignment between 
the goal of the corporation and the observed practices of charitable donation by the companies. 
Since then, the studies on understanding the motivation of charitable donations, sometimes even 
including CSR, However, on the other hand, other researchers have found weak or no evidence of 
relationship between charitable donation and financial performance of the donating firm, 
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concluding that charitable donation is a result of agency issue at the firm, not motivated by profit-
maximization motives (for an extensive literature survey, refer to Gautier and Pache (2015)).  
 While academic evaluation of the donating practice has centered around evaluating 
Friedman Doctrine, the explanation on motives provided by the research has not fully explained 
the observed practices of the charitable donations. It can easily be observed that firms do often 
contribute to different nations and causes that is completely unrelated to the firm’s main businesses, 
but for pure altruism. Many U.S. public corporations donate outside of the country to help the 
education, living condition, an environmental condition of the developing world, and it is hard to 
imagine that any of the charitable donation made could generate any financial “return” in 
foreseeable future. Similarly, some companies engage in charitable donation as a mean of strategic 
marketing, crafting strategies that align the societal value with business interest.5 Clearly, real 
practice of corporate charitable donations reaches beyond profit-maximization motives and 
suggest other possible reasons such as altruism, marketing, or publicity-seeking drive the 
motivation for making donations. Therefore, any empirical testing that does not consider different 
additional dimensions of charitable donation but simply use the amount of donation may mis-
specify the test and not provide the most accurate inference.   
 To address the complex nature of motivation for corporate charitable donation, I consider 
types of donations classified into four different categories as the main indicator that reveals certain 
dimension of underlying motives and make predictions on how they are affected by different 
possible motives of charitable donation. One underlying assumption across all formed hypotheses 
is that any statement publicized in news article conveys messages to specific group of stakeholders. 
 
 
5 One example could be TOMS, a company that donates a pair of shoes for one pair bought by the customer. 
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 Cover-up Motive 
Some corporations, due to their nature of businesses, are more prone to come under greater scrutiny 
and draw more severe negative attention. Widely referred to as “sin” industry, companies that 
operate in gambling, alcohol beverages, and tobacco are known to face real financial limitations 
(Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)). Meanwhile, other firms may face reputation risk after their 
wrongdoing is found out and charged guilty in any legal dispute. In both cases, corporations would 
be motivated to exert effort to cover up the negative aspect of the current business or legal risk 
surfaced from the cases charged. While corporate charitable donation has often been one of the 
sought-after means of improving tainted corporate images, it has not been made clear which topic 
of donation is being primarily used for making improvement on the image. I hypothesize that for 
cover-up motives, donations related to managerial benefit or publicity will not be made, because 
theoretical understanding proposed by Benabou and Tirole (2006) shows that the beneficiary of 
any charitable behavior that achieves publicly observable gain for the donor discounts the value of 
such charitable act if done excessively. In other words, if what companies would gain from 
charitable donation is obvious in the first place, people will discount the meaning and cast serious 
doubt on the underlying intention. Therefore, making donations that provide managerial gain or 
publicity benefit would not help but destroy the very reputation that companies intended to 
improve, as audiences of the news already see the benefit arising from donations. Instead, firms 
motivated for covering up bad name would make donations targeted for altruism or community, 
as the possible benefit for the donor is not as obvious, delivering genuine message to the 




H1.a.: Firms that donate out of cover-up motives (sin industry, legal penalty) make more 
donations that pertain to community and publicity topics, but not managerial benefit or 
altruism. 
   
Conversely, even if the donation is being made to make up for the possible bad reputation, 
if both parties fully understand such intent and rationally expect donations to take place, the topic 
of donation being made will be irrelevant in making up as long as some amount of charitable 
donation is made. That is, charitable donation effectively becomes a tax for operating in certain 
business or exhibiting certain behavior. Therefore,  
 
H1.b.: Firms that donate out of cover-up motives (sin industry, legal penalty) make more 
donations in general, regardless of specific topics or audience. 
 
To test the hypothesis, I evaluate those companies that operate in sin industry6 (gaming, 
alcohol, tobacco, weapon, and oil) and companies that received penalties from court ruling. The 
list of sin industry is taken from Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Cai et al. (2011). For the 
violation data, I take the comprehensive violation records of firms from violation tracking section 
of goodjobsfirst.org webpage. The webpage keeps track of cases of legal violation that have been 
escalated into formal suits that also received a final verdict with penalty amount charged to the 
firm. If cover-up motives exist, I expect to observe a positive relationship between charitable 
donations and firms that are in sin industry or firms who received a penalty. Furthermore, I expect 
 
6 Alcohol firms are identified with SIC codes 2100–2199.Tobacco firms are identified with SIC codes 2080–2085. Weapon firms 
are SIC codes 3760–3769, 3795, 3480–3489. And oil industry firms are SIC codes 1300, 1310–1339, 1370–1382, 1389, 




to observer higher tendency of making donations to community purpose than altruism, as 
community-oriented donations will have more direct appeal in increasing reputation. 
 
 Business Reputation Motive 
The increased reputation not only helps the brand building and name recognition of the company, 
but also positively contributes to the profitability as increased reputation creates loyal customers 
and reduces their price elasticity of the company’s product. Increased reputation especially helps 
companies in more competitive industry where product differentiation is more difficult. Because 
engaging in socially responsible behavior such as charitable donation serves as a product-
differentiation tool and is known to increase the reputation of the engaging firm (Brammer and 
Millington (2005)), firms that have the need to increase the customer awareness through 
benevolent action of the company would be motivated to increase donations with certain 
dimensions. Specifically, firms that are donating out of reputation increasing motives should be 
making more donations that include community and publicity topics. Therefore, 
 
H2.a.: Firms that donate out of business reputation motives make more donations that 
pertain to community and publicity topics. 
 
To test this empirically, I measure the need for reputation building in following ways. First, 
if the industry in which the firm belongs is more competitive, the need for building better 
reputation to earn sales would increase. Therefore, using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a 
measure of industry competition and need for higher business reputation, I expect to observe 
negative association between HHI and the amount of donations made for community and publicity. 
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In addition, I also use the percentage market share of the of sales within two-digit SIC industry 
group as an alternate measure of reputation increasing needs and test the relationship with donation. 
For these variables, I also expect to observe negative relationship with the amount of donations 
made as higher marker share may indicate less needs to increase business reputation to compete 
for the business. 
On the other hand, understanding that charitable donation could be used as reputation 
enhancing device, firms who may have more resource would be motivated to donate more, creating 
peer-pressure within the industry. In such case, the market leader in more concentrated market 
may be making the most donation. Therefore,   
 
H2.b.: If all firms donate out of business reputation motives, donation out of business 
motives will create peer-pressure, causing the firm to donate more in all topics. 
 
Under the premise that every manager behaves rationally, if firms are donating out of 
business reputation motives, I expect to see positive relationship between HH index / market shares 
and the amount of donation being made.  
 
 
 Personal Fulfillment Motives 
Separation of ownership and control in modern public corporations has created incentive and 
governance problems between the manager and the shareholder of the company, especially with 
the free cash flow available inside the corporation (Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)). Because the mechanism of how decisions related to charitable donation remains unknown, 
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some studies on corporate charitable donation attributed the motivation for donation on managerial 
preference and have examined whether making of charitable donation was due to simply 
manager’s own discretion serving personal interest. To test this idea, Masulis and Reza (2015) 
examine whether various managerial characteristic such as age, tenure, or ownership affects the 
donation decision, and find that only CEO connection and ownership are the relevant determinants. 
However, these institutional factors still do not explain whether the donations were motivated out 
of individual and personal preference or some institutional factors. While accurate measurement 
of individual intention or behavior is difficult, my data allows to test and draw line between 
whether individual preference for altruism or private benefit motivated the manger to make 
charitable donation decision, as the topics of donation have been identified with LDA technique. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that if the donation decision is made at individual level and is geared 
toward fulfilling personal aspiration for altruism, I expect to observe the individual managerial 
characteristics to be more related to donations with altruism or community topic. However, if the 
donation is motivated by private benefit needs or to gain individual reputation, a positive 
relationship should be found with individual characteristic and the donations with Managerial 
Benefit or Publicity topic. Likewise, if some systematic factors within the governance structure of 
the firm led to management decision on making charitable donation, I expect to see less inclination 
toward donating for altruism or community topic. Rather, I expect to observe more inclination 
toward managerial benefit because if the governing group made the decision as a whole, they 




H3.a.: If the corporate charitable donation is motivated with personal altruistic reasons, 
individual characteristics should be associated with donations pertaining to community and 
altruism topics.  
 
H3.b.: If the corporate charitable donation is motivated with personal benefit seeking reason, 
individual characteristics should be associated with donations pertaining to managerial 
benefit.  
 
H3.c: If the donation is motivated systematically out of firm’s managerial decision, 





Firms may be interested in making charitable donations because they would like to deliver signals 
that may reveal some positive information about intangible aspects of the business. As making 
donations involves a transfer of free cash that the company could operate without, the very action 
reveals information that the donating company is financially viable, or at least during the period 
when the donation is pledged for. Similarly, other researches that looked at the benefitting 
mechanism of CSR is more geared toward to reducing information asymmetry and therefore 
overall risk reduction (Jo and Na (2012), Albuquerque et al. (2018)). However, unlike other 
motives, predicting a hypothesis with respect to signaling motive could be dubious as it is unclear 
which component of charitable donation reveals the information and communicates the intangible 
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aspect of the business. It could well be that the action of making donation itself could serve or 
what the money is being donated for or the purpose. If it is former, any donation directed to address 
any topics identified through LDA will have as much of an effect, because it is the donation, not 
necessarily what it is for, that would send the respective signal about the intangible aspect of the 
company. Vice versa, if the target of the donation helps send out more genuine signal for the 
audience, then only certain type of donations made would be more effective in communicating the 
intangible aspect. Similar to cover-up motives, if the genuineness of the donation matters, 
donations made for community or altruism reason would be associated with the measures of 
information asymmetry. Therefore, two possible hypotheses arise. 
 
H4.a: If the donating behavior itself is what conveys the information, firms that donate out of 
signaling motives make more donations that do not have any particular leanings to any of the 
topics.  
 
H4.b: If the beneficiary of the donating behavior matters, firms that donate out of signaling 
motives make more donations that pertain to community and altruism topics, but not 
managerial benefit or publicity. 
 
For the measure of information asymmetry, I use analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion before the 
earnings announcement measured by standard deviation. For the overall level of risk for the firm, 





5. Empirical Tests  
A. Determinants of Donation 
To test four different hypotheses on the motives behind corporate charitable donations, I use panel 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression with fixed effects at both firm and industry-year level as a 
default specification. Because some firm characteristics of interest may remain the same over time, 
depending on the variable of interesting, I specify different fixed effects only at firm and year level, 
or firm and industry-year level. However, to allow for the most rigorous setup for the test, I specify 
firm and industry-year level fixed effect regression as the default setting. 
 To first understand which firm level characteristic determines the charitable donation with 
different topics, I put various firm level financial characteristics and firm characteristics to test. As 
charitable donation is a free transfer of wealth, I test whether any profitability and performance 
related variables explain the tendency to make more donation. As pointed out in Gautier and Pache 
(2015), the overall financial circumstance and the available resource could be an important driver 
of charitable activity. Similarly, I also include the size, age, and governance characteristic of the 
firm that have been studied to affect donation decision (Masulis and Reza (2015)). The research 
question this test is trying to answer is whether other types of donation identified through topic 
modeling exhibits similar or different tendency in determining the amount of donation made by 
the firm.  
Table 2 presents the result on determinants of firm level across all sample, and each sub-
sample for Altruism, Managerial Benefit, Community and Publicity. Evaluating the test with full 
sample, firm characteristics that indicate level of financial resource within the firm, Tobin’s q, 
investment, and cash reserve, are positively correlated with the donation level. This is reasonable 
as extra financial resource should be the first consideration for firms to make any type of charitable 
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donation. If the firm is making donation while it is struggling to perform would clearly go against 
the notion of serving shareholder’s value.   
The breakdown of the determinants for topic allows further understanding on the charitable 
donation behavior of the firm. The overall test result seems to indicate that financial contingency 
and circumstance is the de facto determinant of the donation decision. Similar to the full sample 
analysis, for donations on altruism and managerial motive topic, cash reserve is positively 
correlated, but not topics on community or publicity. Similarly, it is also interesting to notice the 
market leverage is negatively associated with community donation, providing additional 
possibility that some donations are closely tied to financial contingency of the firm, while some 
others are not. The result for Tobin’s q seems to indicate that the financial contingency is important. 
Firm size seems to be the one of the significant determinants in making donations for the company, 
but only for specific donation topics. The bigger the firm, the more donation is made and reported 
for altruism and community topic. This seems in line with what we observe in the society, as bigger 
companies and known to make more donations to the society. It is also interesting to note that the 
level of entrenchment measure developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), or E-Index does not present 
any pattern for different motives of donations. This may suggest that the charitable donation 
behavior is not a result of lax monitoring, but possibly a strategic decision made by the firm 
depending on the situation and purpose in mind by the management. All in all, the test result from 




B. Test of Cover-up Motives 
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To evaluate Cover-up motive of corporate charitable donation, I use both specific type of industry 
that the firm belongs to (sin industry) and the amount of penalty fine arising from legal violation 
as the measures of cover-up motivation in making donations. As specified, if the firms are indeed 
making donations out of Cover-up motives to either manage their reputation for working in 
socially “sinful” businesses or make up for the damaged reputation through bad behaviors, one 
would expect to see increase in the donation concerning community and publicity. One minute 
difference between using sin industry as the measure of Cover-up motives versus penalty fine 
resulted from court decision is that firms in sin industry may not be necessarily engaged in socially 
unacceptable behavior, while firms that are charged with penalty have, leaving no specific 
audience of interest for the donation behavior. Rather, they may simply be donating to make up 
for the bad image their nature of business innately has. 
 Table 3 presents the result of OLS regression with industry-year fixed effect testing Cover-
up motive. To test the motive, I first use an indicator variable whether the company operates in sin 
industry, along with all other variables tested in Table 2 as control variables. The result of test for 
sin industry in shown in Panel A. As hypothesized, firms in sin industry are motivated to make 
more donations than those firms that do not belong to the sin industry. The positive association 
exists across all different topics of donations identified through GLDA model, except for the 
donation on altruism topic. It is interesting to note that while most of the types of donations topics 
positively correlated, for sin industry, the magnitude of relationship for donation for Publicity is 
larger than that of Community or Managerial Benefit. This strongly suggests that firms are indeed 
motivated to make donations to strategically manage their images by making donations that may 
expose the name and presence of the company to public. In addition, this confirms the 
hypothesized Cover-up motivation where there exists some understanding and expectation on the 
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general level of charitable donation by those companies in the sin industries, suggesting donations 
are strategically made to mend the reputation for firms operating in sin industry. 
 Panel B of Table 3 tests the Cover-up Motives using different measure, amount of penalty 
charged by the legal decision. Similar to sin industry, the penalty charged is also positively 
associated with firm-level charitable donation on altruism, managerial benefit, and community 
related topics. The result confirms that firms indeed are motivated to make donation to cover up 
past misdeed that may damage the reputation and sustainability of the corporate business. In 
addition, it is interesting to note that firms are not focusing on donations with publicity topics, but 
on altruism, managerial benefit, and community. The firm’s tendency to focus its donation effort 
on altruism and community reveals that firms are making calculated choices on donation purpose 
where the reversal of damaged reputation could be more effective. As studies from management 
science show that showing genuineness in the intention of donation is important (Godfrey (2005)), 
making community or altruism related donations would likely to be accepted as more genuine if 
company is caught violating employment contract or environment regulation that may have 
affected the relevant party directly. This is also in line with the proposed hypothesis that making 
donations whose end goal is not as obvious has more positive effect on earning reputation, instead 
of being discounted as ingenuine. Therefore, firms that are motivated with Cover-up would 
intentionally focus more on both the altruism and community related donations that would generate 
better repairing effect on the damaged reputation of the company.  
 Overall, these two tests reveal that companies are motivated to make donations based on 
their needs to cover up the both the bad deeds that are committed by the firm and to make up for 
the inseparable negative perception arising from the nature of business the firm is operating in.  
 
C. Test of Business Reputation Motives 
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To examine whether firms are making charitable donation out of improving their business 
reputation, I employ two different measures of needs for business reputation motives. First, to 
measure the overall competitiveness of the industry in which the firm belongs, I use Herfindahl – 
Hirschman Index (HH Index) to gauge the overall needs for companies to differentiate themselves 
and improve the business reputation. The result of test using OLS regression is shown in Panel A 
of Table 4. Overall, there exists no statistically significant relationship between HH Index and the 
overall level of donation, confirming that not every firm is particularly motivated to make 
donations out of business reputation needs. However, further test shows the hypothesized negative 
association between the donation for community and publicity topic and the overall level of market 
competitiveness. The result indicates that firms may be motivated to donate out of business 
reputation motive, suggesting that charitable donation could serve as an alternative marketing 
tactics that firms may implement if the competitiveness of the industry is high. 
 To further test the business reputation motives hypothesis of charitable donation, I use 
market share of the company as an alternate measure to proxy for the firm’s need to increase 
business reputation. Market share is calculated by the percentage sales within two-digit SIC 
industry classification. Similar to the results from using HH Index, the overall donation has no 
particular relationship with the percentage market share. However, with each specific topic except 
Managerial Benefit, there exists a negative correlation between the market share and the level of 
donation. As hypothesized, because the firm with more market share would be less motivated to 
make charitable donation pertaining to publicity or community to increase awareness and 
reputation, the result seems to indicate more clearly that firms may be motivated to make charitable 
donation out of business reputation needs. The difference in the result from using HH Index as a 
measure of need for better reputation could be explained by the fact that whereas HH index 
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measures the overall industry competitiveness, the percentage market share measures more direct 
needs for increase in business reputation and motivation. Therefore, while firms in more 
competitive industry are obliged to make community related donation as part of the peer pressure 
within the industry, a firm with weaker sales may be more directly motivated to make charitable 
donations that may impact the overall publicity of the company and product more.  
Overall, the test of business reputation motive shows supporting evidence that some firms 
are making donations out business reputation needs, however, the motivation only drives the 
corporate charitable donation in certain topic more than the other, specifically Community and 
Publicity topics. The fact that there is no overall relationship observable for the whole sample 
makes sense because the most probable best practice for improving name value and differentiation 
should be advertisement effort and marketing drive with respect to price of the product but not 
necessarily the image of “good” corporation whose effect may be not as direct. While there may 
be some firms or topic of donation that may help firm by improving its image via charitable 
donation (e.g. coffee industry) more than the other, it is hard to imagine that the effect could so 
large as to create systematic differences for the firms in general. Yet, it is evident that firms are 
very strategic and mindful with their charitable donation decision and make donations out of 
business reputation motivation.  
 
D. Test of Personal Fulfillment Motives 
Another set of motivation for making charitable donation could be personal goal and aspiration of 
an individual manager, namely CEO. Indeed, some studies have examined that donation decision 
is mainly out of individual decision and found that some investors act negatively even to the news 
on a personal pledge for charitable donation with the CEO’s personal wealth. To test whether 
charitable donations are out of CEO’s individual personal fulfilment on altruism or search of 
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private benefit, I test whether individual CEO characteristic such as age, gender, ownership, and 
tenure of the position are associated with any of the topics of donation being made by the firm. 
Information on both CEO characteristic and board characteristic are obtained from Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) database. From the database, I collect information both on CEO and 
the structure of the board.  
The result of the test is presented in Table 5 Panel A. Regression analysis on the full sample 
suggests that the CEO ownership and tenure are statistically significant explanatory power, each 
showing opposite direction. CEO ownership is negatively correlated while CEO tenure is 
positively correlated. The relationship between charitable donation level and CEO ownership is 
reasonable, as higher ownership would represent more stake in the available resource of the firm, 
discouraging the free transfer of the money unless good reason exists. CEO tenure is also a 
reasonable determinant for donation as CEO tenure seems to provide the CEO with more influence 
to push for charitable donation decision if desired. While CEO’s individual characteristic such as 
age and gender does not determine the overall level of donation, when analyzed separately under 
different topics, different results arise. For the gender of the CEO, when female, there is less 
tendency to donate for community and publicity related topics. While other topics show 
statistically insignificant result, the overall direction suggests lower level of donation for female 
CEO compared to male CEO. A caution is needed in interpreting the result, as the current test does 
not explicitly reveal whether it is the gender, or some other unobserved factor represented by the 
gender. Age of CEO is another individual characteristic that provide puzzling evidence as the age 
is positively associated with both donations with managerial benefit and community topic but is 
negatively associated with the altruism. One possible interpretation of the result is that younger 
CEO’s may be under more pressure to establish caring image and expected to have higher 
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awareness regarding “sustainability” and act accordingly. The result of the test partially confirms 
that charitable donation may be motivated out of personal fulfillment on altruistic reason, but it 
does not provide further clear-cut evidence that charitable donation decision is mainly driven out 
of individual’s altruistic needs only. Rather, the test result suggests that the combination of 
individual altruistic motive and other systematic characteristic at management level could motivate 
to donate at firm level.  
To confirm whether any systematic characteristic on governance has any impact on the 
amount of donation being made, I test different governance characteristic variables that may shed 
some light on the motives of corporate charitable donation. Results are shown in Panel B of Table 
6. Overall, no governance characteristic is associated with the donation, suggesting that donation 
decision is made more at individual manager level than systematic management level. However, 
from tests on individual topics, it can be confirmed that some governance related characteristics 
have correlations with donation. One notable governance characteristic is entrenchment index (E 
Index) that shows negative correlation with donations on altruism and community topic. This 
explains that higher the entrenchment of the management, the less likely the management is willing 
to freely transfer internal resources to outsiders. Another notable governance variable is CEO-
chairman duality, an indicator whether the CEO of the company is also the chairman. The test 
result shows that CEO-chairman duality is positively associated with the amount of donation being 
made to Managerial Benefit topic while negatively related to altruism topic. This test result 
suggests that the CEO’s overall level of influence in the board room affects the donation decision, 
as the fraction of independent director has limited effect on the donation on managerial benefit 
topic only. Although no strong and consistent evidence is found to argue that the effect of 
governance characteristic of the donating firm is substantial on the donation decision, some 
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governance characteristics seem to have some influence donations on altruism and managerial 
benefit than community and publicity topic. All in all, test of personal level motivation shows that 
CEO’s personal level altruism could partially motivate the firm to make donations on specific topic 
of interest.  
 
E. Test of Signaling Motives 
Firms may be motivated to make charitable donation because companies may want to convey soft 
information on certain aspect of business that cannot easily be quantified. Therefore, charitable 
donation by the firm may be used as a tool to convey the soft information, aiming to reduce the 
information asymmetry or perceived risk level of the firm. Therefore, to test the motivation for 
making charitable donation out of signaling motive, I use dispersion in the analysts’ forecast on 
earnings announcement and cost of equity to proxy for the firm’s need to make charitable 
donations out of signaling motive. Table 6 presents the result. Using yearly average of analysts’ 
forecast dispersion as the measure for motivation of signaling, I find no statistically significant 
relationship on firm’s signaling motivation (Panel A).  No apparent relationship between forecast 
dispersion and donation seems reasonable as charitable donation would only be secondary effort 
that the company could make with respect to reducing information asymmetry on business related 
activities. Panel B of Table 6 presents the result of test using cost of equity as the measure for 
signaling motives. Unlike dispersion measure, cost of equity is positively correlated with donation 
for the full sample.  However, no statistically significant relationship is detected on different topics 
of donations, suggesting that signaling motive is unlikely motive for the firm making charitable 
donation decision.  
 
F. Effect of Donation on Firm-level Outcome 
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In evaluating what drives the corporate charitable donation decision from previous empirical tests, 
I find evidence that corporate’s donation decision reaches beyond simple altruism and seem more 
like a strategic choice that the firm makes. To evaluate whether donation decision also has strategic 
outcome at firm level, I test whether charitable donation has any effects on firm-level financial 
variables in OLS regression setting with both firm and year fixed effect.  
 Table 7 presents the effect of publicized donation on firm’s financial outcome. To first test 
whether the donation amount is associated with the profitability, I use Return on Asset (ROA) of 
the next year as the measure of profitability. I use the next year’s ROA to avoid any possible 
correlation within the same year. The result from Panel A suggests that the charitable donation 
made is positively correlated with the next year’s profitability, but only on the donations made to 
altruism topic. The fact that the statistically significant relationship is detected in only one of the 
topics is interesting, as previous studies that attempted to answer whether charitable donation leads 
any financial gain have long struggled to find convincing evidence that “doing good” would lead 
to financially “doing better”. Some articles have found positive relationship, while other studies 
have found no relationship, leaving the question of financial benefit of charitable donation largely 
inconclusive.  
The test result provides some possibility why previous studies that did not distinguish any 
topic had little success. As discussed, the only statistically significant relationship is the donation 
on altruism, while the rest topics have no relationship. This suggests that any previous studies 
evaluating financial benefit were unsuccessful because researchers could not identify the latent 
structure in the specific topic and therefore could not capture the differences in the relationship 
among different topics of donations. As how the philanthropic action is perceived is also important 
in delivering a value, a lack of consideration on topics could have resulted in mixed evidences with 
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only using one combined measure of charitable donation.  However, one thing to note is that while 
there may exists a statistically significant relationship, the magnitude of the benefit is negligible 
that it could be ignored or seek out an alternate profit-maximizing strategy. 
 Panel B presents the effect of donation on the analyst forecast dispersion. As discussed, 
charitable donation decision may convey some signal about the firm’s soft information and 
therefore reduce information asymmetry. The test result seems to suggest that while firms are not 
motivated to make donation out of signaling motive, the opposite could be true that making 
donation has information signaling characteristic. Indeed, donations to altruism topic is negatively 
associated with the analysts’ forecast dispersion.  While no feasible explanations may exist, it 
could be the case that higher exposure of philanthropic donation may deliver signals to people and 
of actions report in charitable donation article may be beneficial to communicating information 
and reducing uncertainties.  
 Panel C tests whether donation also affects the overall level of riskiness of the firm, 
measured by the cost of capital. Using fitted return from Fama French three factor model, the test 
suggests that charitable donation is negatively related to the proxy of perceived risk. While test on 
all sample seem to suggest an underlying mechanism similar to forecast dispersion, it is extremely 
interesting to note that the relationship between donations made on altruism topic is positively 
related to the perceived level of risk. This may imply that the market has discerning power to 
understand the cover-up motive of the donating company and react rationally and take the 
information into consideration.  
To test for whether there exists any firm value implication, I test whether the firm value 
proxied by Tobin’s Q has any association with the charitable donation. The test result is presented 
in Panel D. While most of the donations across full sample and on specific topics have positive 
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correlation with the firm value, donations on altruism shows negative relationship and donations 
on community topic has no statistically meaningful association. It is interesting to note donation 
made to altruism topic could be perceived as a sign of value destroying activity. Overall, corporate 




Despite rising attention on socially responsible behavior of corporations and on sustainability of 
business endeavor, an understanding on why corporations would make charitable donation remains 
minimal, as it has been difficult to distinguish possible underlying motives with the currently 
available dataset and lack of information on how philanthropic behavior could be classified. To 
address this difficulty and provide deeper understanding on the underlying motivations behind 
corporate charitable donation, this paper studies the latent verbal structure in the news article of 
charitable donation of the firms using guided LDA topic modeling technique. From large-scale 
text data of charitable donation from news article, I identify four different underlying topics that 
reveal certain aspects that would be affected differently with different possible motives of donation.  
With this classification, I provide evidence that while firms may donate to support altruism, seek 
managerial benefit, help community, and increase its publicity by exposing the good behavior, 
firms are mostly focused on donation topics related to managerial benefit and publicity through 
donation.  To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to understand corporate 
charitable donation using machine learning technique. 
To further shed light on behind motives of firm’s charitable donation decision, I test four 
different hypotheses on motivations of donations that could affect the identified topics of charitable 
36 
 
donations differently. Specifically, I test whether corporate charitable donation is made from 
Cover-up, Business Reputation, Personal Fulfilment, or Signaling motives. I find that firms are 
mainly motivated to use charitable donation as a tool to cover up bad reputations and make up its 
misdeeds, and for business reasons to increase awareness of the customers. While personal 
altruistic motivation of the CEO may motivate firm’s charitable donation, governance reason alone 
does not motivate donations.  I do not find any systematic evidence that the needs for signaling 
soft information as one of the possible motivations for donations. Overall, I find that the donation 
decision of the firm is motivated out of highly strategic decision to manage the reputation on both 
business and notoriety, but not a result of sole personal fulfillment or expropriation of corporate 
wealth as a result of governance failure. Finally, I document that the firm’s charitable donation on 
certain topics is associated with higher profitability, reduced information asymmetry, lower risk, 
and higher firm value.  This finding strongly suggests that the source of value in the philanthropic 
endeavor may arise from specific topic of donation, but not from all possible donation topics. All 
in all, I find that charitable donation decision is motivated out of strategic reason for well-defined 
group of target audience in order to gain benefit, but not out of personal whim or expropriation of 
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Chart 1. Charitable Donation made in the United States 
This chart presents the amount of donations made by corporations and foundations each year in the 
United States. Corporation donation is donation made directly by the corporations. Foundation donations 
include donations made by foundations that are directly affiliated with corporations and independent 
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Chart 2. Distribution of Topics within News Articles 
This chart presents the topic distribution of within the news article documents in the data. Four topics 
have been selected for the guided Latent Dirichlet Allocation analysis on the texts of articles. Simulation 
was configured at 5,000 with initial 100 burn-in repetitions. Altruism, Managerial Benefit, Community, 
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Chart 3. Top 10 Keywords for Each Topic by Importance 






Chart 4: Topic Coherence Test 
This chart presents the result of topic coherence score result evaluating the potential number of topics that 


















Table 1: Summary Statistics: 
This table reports summary statistics of variable used in the test. Donation is the amount of charitable donation 
specified in the news articles data collected. Donations with each respective topics only include samples with 
donations identified as those topics from the LDA analysis. Panel A describes the donation with each type 
from news article data. Panel B is donation from tax filing data. Panel C presents the donation from news 
article dataset with Fama-French 12 industry classification. Panel D describes the firm-level variables. Detailed 
descriptions of how variables are calculated is in Appendix 3. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
P25 P50 P75 
 
Panel A: Donation Amount collected from News Article (in millions dollar, excluding 0) 
Philanthropic Donation 100,309 7.271 698.000 0.035 0.187 0.831 
       
Donation - Altruism 1008 0.236 0.243 0.066 0.089 0.483 
Donation – Managerial Benefit 84,834 7.581 746.151 0.035 0.186 0.826 
Donation – Community 1,319 2.763 15.254 0.037 0.210 0.919 
Donation - Publicity 13,148 5.334 200.160 0.035 0.195 0.866 
 
 
Panel B: Donation Amount from Tax Filing Data (in millions dollar) 
Total Donation (Firm-Year) 3,227 4.740 13.021 0.186 0.750 3.974 
       
       
 
Panel C: Donation Amount in News by Fama-French 12 Industry Classifications (in millions dollar) 
Consumer Non-Durable 952 0.751 1.85 0.016 0.185 0.605 
Consumer Durable 1,253 0.752 2.64 0.045 0.217 0.718 
Manufacturing 5,391 1.542 15.99 0.020 0.100 0.380 
Oil, Gas, and Coal 1,673 72.65 1,692.79 0.082 0.443 1.119 
Chemicals and Allied Products 91 0.304 0.34 0.041 0.131 0.508 
Business Equipment 23,626 4.934 17.40 0.043 0.241 1.235 
Telephone and TV Transmission 1,380 0.812 2.58 0.034 0.184 0.740 
Utilities 9,379 3.137 220.43 0.026 0.130 0.545 
Wholesale, Retail, Services 5,112 3.756 6.02 0.041 0.307 3.557 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, 
Drugs 
1,538 1.023 7.89 0.036 0.193 0.694 
Finance 47,199 9.052 962.85 0.032 0.173 0.754 
Others - Mines, Construction, 
Building Maintenance, 
Transportations, Hotels, 
Bus Service, Entertainment 
2,721 1.779 10.12 0.044 0.300 0.906 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel D: Firm Characteristics N Mean Std. Dev P25 P50 P75 
       
Financial Characteristic       
Cash 102,227 0.137 0.114 0.038 0.128 0.190 
Tobin's q 102,227 1.702 0.956 0.876 1.473 2.324 
Investment 102,227 0.056 0.035 0.034 0.049 0.080 
Log(asset) 102,227 10.788 0.825 10.769 11.211 11.211 
ROA 102,227 0.133 0.077 0.070 0.123 0.174 
Market Leverage 102,227 0.210 0.190 0.073 0.130 0.325 
Total Dividend 102,210 0.416 0.516 0.218 0.306 0.528 
Dispersion 97,650 0.050 0.102 0.018 0.036 0.053 
Cost of Equity 98,043 0.089 0.193 0.025 0.098 0.167 
       
Firm Characteristic       
E Index 102,227 3.314 0.822 3 3 4 
Sin Industry 102,227 0.029 0.168 0 0 0 
Market Share 102,227 0.101 0.123 0.015 0.054 0.149 
HH Index 102,227 621.496 815.528 235 371 524 
CEO Age 97,398 57.481 6.266 53 57 61 
Female? 97,398 0.053 0.223 0 0 0 
CEO-chairman Duality 97,398 0.529 0.499 0 1 1 
%Independent Director 29,487 0.838 0.075 0.800 0.875 0.875 
CEO Tenure 97,398 6.437 7.889 2 4 7 
CEO Ownership 97,398 0.004 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Board Size 97,398 10.766 2.570 8 11 12 
Total Penalty 64,148 0.0003 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 





Table 2: Firm Characteristic Determinants of Each Topic 
This table presents the results of OLS regression regressing different corporate variables on corporate charitable 
donation covered in the news article. Column (1) includes all samples with donation amount available from the 
article. Donations with each respective topic only include samples with donations identified as those topics from 
the LDA analysis. Definition of financial variables is available in Appendix 1. Fixed effects are specified at firm 
level and industry-year level. All coefficients are standardized with standard deviation. Numbers in parenthesis 
are t-statistics clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 















      
Financial Characteristics      
Log(asset) 0.010 0.898*** -0.011 1.077*** 0.102 
 (0.33) (6.30) (-0.40) (5.42) (1.36) 
Market Leverage -0.003 -0.773 0.001 -1.231*** -0.038 
 (-0.15) (-1.63) (0.05) (-4.88) (-0.78) 
Tobin's q 0.057*** -0.452*** 0.047*** -0.149 0.102*** 
 (5.23) (-2.98) (4.33) (-1.45) (3.27) 
Investment 0.034*** 0.122 0.021** 0.293*** 0.118*** 
 (3.62) (1.42) (2.06) (3.50) (5.27) 
Cash 0.030** 0.356*** 0.031*** 0.030 0.030 
 (2.51) (4.66) (2.83) (0.36) (0.84) 
ROA 0.008 0.004 0.014 -0.572*** -0.036 
 (0.49) (0.03) (0.87) (-6.83) (-1.39) 
Total Dividend 0.009 -0.146 0.010* -0.115* -0.013 
 (1.56) (-1.18) (1.79) (-1.87) (-0.61) 
      
Firm Characteristics      
E Index 0.003 -0.438 0.010 -0.174 -0.043 
 (0.30) (-1.68) (0.88) (-0.88) (-1.38) 
Constant 0.537 -11.248*** 0.807** -11.820*** -0.567 
 (1.30) (-4.47) (2.20) (-4.50) (-0.52) 
      
Observations 102,544 762 89,810 1,084 13,120 
R-squared 0.052 0.196 0.054 0.184 0.069 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 3: Test of Cover-up Motives 
This table presents the results of OLS regression tests for evaluating cover-up motives of the corporate charitable 
donation. Donation is the amount of donation identified from the article text. Panel A presents the results on sin 
industry. Sin industry refers to the firms that operate in alcohol, tobacco, oil, gaming, and weapons industry. 
Panel B presents the results on penalty fine charged. Penalty is a natural log amount of total fine amount in US 
dollar charged during each calendar year. Donations with each respective topic only include samples with 
donations identified as those topics from the LDA analysis. Definition of financial variables is available in 
Appendix 1. Fixed effects are specified at industry-year level for Panel A, and firm level and industry-year level 
for Panel B. All coefficients are standardized with standard deviation. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics 
clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Sin Industry      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








      
Sin Industry 0.085*** 0.035 0.078*** 0.107*** 0.123*** 
 (12.87) (0.94) (11.78) (4.42) (5.46) 
      
Log(asset) 0.045** -0.030 0.044** 0.053 0.047** 
 (2.44) (-0.32) (2.44) (0.63) (2.21) 
Market Leverage -0.042* -0.290** -0.045** -0.156 -0.030 
 (-1.95) (-2.59) (-2.12) (-1.50) (-1.00) 
Tobin's q 0.073** -0.310** 0.068** 0.197 0.076** 
 (2.47) (-2.50) (2.34) (1.29) (2.00) 
Investment -0.039*** -0.063 -0.036*** -0.018 -0.061*** 
 (-3.03) (-1.08) (-2.86) (-0.24) (-3.35) 
Cash -0.025 0.219*** -0.026 0.041 -0.007 
 (-0.88) (2.90) (-0.89) (0.46) (-0.23) 
ROA -0.011 0.080 -0.010 -0.218* -0.002 
 (-0.35) (0.81) (-0.34) (-1.97) (-0.05) 
E Index -0.097*** -0.213** -0.098*** 0.024 -0.097*** 
 (-2.79) (-2.25) (-2.65) (0.41) (-3.71) 
Constant 0.705** 2.932* 0.726** 0.101 0.669* 
 (2.16) (1.81) (2.23) (0.08) (1.87) 
      
Observations 102,591 773 89,856 1,100 13,157 
R-squared 0.035 0.172 0.037 0.144 0.051 
Firm FE No No No No No 





Panel B: Penalty Charged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









      
Penalty 0.025 0.217* 0.027* 0.225** 0.017 
 (1.49) (1.68) (1.65) (2.50) (0.63) 
      
Log(asset) 0.015 -0.093 0.017 -0.032 0.008 
 (0.69) (-0.63) (0.75) (-0.35) (0.25) 
Market Leverage -0.056* -0.286** -0.057* -0.135 -0.056 
 (-1.75) (-2.30) (-1.84) (-1.61) (-1.21) 
Tobin's q 0.036 -0.234 0.050* 0.152 -0.041 
 (1.37) (-0.62) (1.73) (0.65) (-1.48) 
Investment -0.018 0.043 -0.018 0.142 -0.022 
 (-0.74) (0.32) (-0.77) (1.53) (-0.65) 
Cash -0.055* -0.044 -0.059** -0.161 -0.010 
 (-1.95) (-0.21) (-2.09) (-0.79) (-0.25) 
ROA 0.038 0.001 0.020 -0.137 0.148*** 
 (1.15) (0.01) (0.60) (-0.81) (2.91) 
E Index -0.135*** -0.125 -0.135*** 0.030 -0.123*** 
 (-4.77) (-1.25) (-4.36) (0.35) (-5.05) 
Constant 1.203*** 2.921 1.175*** 0.125 1.228** 
 (3.31) (1.23) (3.13) (0.07) (2.34) 
      
Observations 64,422 482 56,431 679 8,263 
R-squared 0.041 0.163 0.043 0.147 0.057 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 4: Test of Business Reputation Motives 
This table presents the results of OLS regression tests for evaluating Business Reputation motives of the 
corporate charitable donation. Donation is the amount of donation identified from the article text. Panel A 
presents the results on HH Index. HH Index is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for measuring two-digit SIC level 
market concentration. Panel B presents the results on market share. Market share is defined as the percentage of 
individual firm’s sales scaled by the two-digit SIC industry group’s total sales during each calendar year. 
Donations with each respective topic only include samples with donations identified as those topics from the 
LDA analysis. Definition of financial variables is available in Appendix 1. Fixed effects are specified at firm 
level and year level for Panel A, and firm level and industry-year level for Panel B. All coefficients are 
standardized with standard deviation. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics clustered at firm level. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: HH Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








      
HH Index -0.046 -0.574 -0.053 -0.547** -0.036* 
 (-0.97) (-1.46) (-1.08) (-2.11) (-1.72) 
      
Log(asset) -0.038** -0.020 -0.029 0.227 -0.109** 
 (-2.00) (-0.09) (-1.52) (1.03) (-2.26) 
Market Leverage -0.031* -0.139 -0.039** -0.154 0.005 
 (-1.77) (-0.83) (-2.54) (-1.47) (0.10) 
Tobin's q 0.015* -0.138 0.013* -0.021 0.016 
 (1.79) (-1.12) (1.72) (-0.27) (0.68) 
Investment -0.006 0.022 -0.004 0.051 -0.015 
 (-0.49) (0.25) (-0.38) (0.82) (-0.65) 
Cash 0.016 0.182** 0.018** 0.104 0.014 
 (1.61) (2.15) (1.99) (1.66) (0.53) 
ROA 0.009 0.070 0.009 -0.068 0.010 
 (0.60) (0.76) (0.61) (-0.66) (0.35) 
E Index 0.003 -0.131 0.006 0.021 -0.021 
 (0.36) (-1.48) (0.67) (0.24) (-1.00) 
Constant 1.387*** 2.163 1.266*** -1.971 2.390*** 
 (5.27) (0.60) (4.86) (-0.63) (3.65) 
      
Observations 102,607 812 89,874 1,125 13,194 
R-squared 0.047 0.132 0.048 0.103 0.051 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B: Marker Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








      
Market Share -0.016 -1.235** -0.015 -0.334*** -0.037*** 
 (-0.92) (-2.72) (-0.71) (-3.37) (-4.86) 
      
Log(asset) -0.023*** 1.680*** -0.017** 0.374*** -0.049*** 
 (-3.53) (4.59) (-2.45) (4.31) (-3.96) 
Market Leverage 0.011*** 0.173 0.007** -0.016 0.032*** 
 (3.96) (0.23) (2.25) (-0.13) (4.01) 
Tobin's q 0.013** -0.542** 0.013* -0.110 0.012*** 
 (2.22) (-2.42) (1.75) (-1.39) (3.64) 
Investment -0.008 0.081 -0.008 -0.266*** -0.001 
 (-0.68) (0.60) (-0.61) (-3.99) (-0.11) 
Cash 0.016** 0.901*** 0.019** 0.004 0.006* 
 (2.22) (7.25) (2.03) (0.14) (1.79) 
ROA 0.007 1.008*** 0.009 0.092 0.000 
 (1.23) (3.09) (1.34) (1.12) (0.11) 
E Index 0.003 -0.163 0.005 -0.013 -0.001 
 (1.06) (-0.64) (1.23) (-0.24) (-0.58) 
Constant 0.269** -29.136*** 0.183 -4.465*** 0.644*** 
 (2.54) (-4.59) (1.50) (-3.51) (3.93) 
      
Observations 102,564 762 89,828 1,084 13,120 
R-squared 0.014 0.253 0.024 0.047 0.003 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 5: Test of Personal Fulfillment Motives 
This table presents the results of OLS regression tests for evaluating Personal Fulfillment motives of the 
corporate charitable donation. Donation is the amount of donation identified from the article text. Panel A 
presents the results on CEO characteristics. HH Index is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for measuring two-digit 
SIC level market concentration. Panel B presents the results on management characteristics. Donations with each 
respective topic only include samples with donations identified as those topics from the LDA analysis. Definition 
of financial variables is available in Appendix 1. Fixed effects are specified at firm level and industry-year level. 
All coefficients are standardized with standard deviation. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics clustered at firm 
level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: CEO Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









      
CEO Age 0.006 -0.092** 0.010* 0.114*** -0.011 
 (1.10) (-2.04) (1.86) (3.30) (-0.94) 
CEO Ownership -0.018*** 0.212*** -0.023*** -0.008 0.030** 
 (-3.58) (3.26) (-4.48) (-0.21) (2.10) 
CEO Tenure 0.026** 0.169 0.025** 0.023 0.037 
 (2.30) (1.54) (2.23) (0.28) (1.38) 
Female? -0.007 -0.070 -0.004 -0.098*** -0.020* 
 (-0.92) (-1.45) (-0.50) (-3.34) (-1.80) 
      
Log(asset) -0.008 1.169*** -0.039 0.774*** 0.169 
 (-0.19) (6.59) (-1.00) (3.28) (1.53) 
Market Leverage -0.032 -1.024* -0.025 -1.415*** -0.109* 
 (-1.62) (-1.90) (-1.17) (-5.78) (-1.72) 
Tobin's q 0.058*** -0.653*** 0.054*** -0.099 0.069** 
 (4.97) (-3.59) (4.77) (-0.93) (2.32) 
Investment 0.027*** 0.087 0.014 0.221** 0.106*** 
 (3.11) (0.98) (1.44) (2.08) (4.64) 
Cash 0.034* 0.657*** 0.031* -0.004 0.062 
 (1.92) (6.99) (1.89) (-0.04) (1.57) 
ROA 0.019 0.406** 0.020 -0.562*** 0.019 
 (1.13) (2.39) (1.21) (-4.62) (0.61) 
E Index -0.004 -0.569*** 0.004 -0.236 -0.064** 
 (-0.41) (-3.17) (0.39) (-1.37) (-2.23) 
Constant 0.791 -17.466*** 1.191** -9.940*** -1.610 
 (1.27) (-6.55) (2.13) (-2.83) (-0.96) 
      
Observations 97,709 744 85,606 1,046 12,488 
R-squared 0.050 0.204 0.052 0.182 0.068 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B: Governance Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









      
Fraction of Independent Director -0.044 -0.601 -0.048*** 0.025 -0.001 
 (-1.33) (-1.31) (-3.53) (0.05) (-0.03) 
CEO-chairman Duality -0.005 -0.594** 0.041*** -0.057 0.021 
 (-0.26) (-2.74) (6.89) (-0.25) (1.11) 
Board Size -0.031 1.282** 0.016 0.009 -0.009 
 (-0.57) (2.27) (1.00) (0.04) (-0.19) 
E Index 0.007 -0.813*** 0.012 -0.481* -0.049 
 (0.22) (-3.56) (1.07) (-2.06) (-1.37) 
      
Log(asset) 0.399*** 1.293 0.006 0.141 -0.056 
 (5.43) (1.20) (0.12) (0.20) (-0.39) 
Market Leverage -0.119* -1.724** -0.052 -1.461** -0.012 
 (-1.83) (-2.16) (-1.22) (-2.18) (-0.14) 
Tobin's q -0.014 1.446*** -0.012 0.657*** 0.012 
 (-0.28) (4.09) (-0.49) (3.06) (0.23) 
Investment -0.017 1.967*** -0.017 0.743 -0.066 
 (-0.40) (3.63) (-0.69) (1.01) (-0.63) 
Cash 0.035 -0.392 0.053** -0.606* -0.008 
 (0.52) (-1.33) (2.23) (-1.89) (-0.12) 
ROA 0.193*** -0.661*** 0.019 -0.925*** 0.035 
 (3.10) (-6.05) (1.19) (-4.70) (1.16) 
Constant -7.503*** -43.928 1.117 0.902 2.511 
 (-4.68) (-1.19) (1.04) (0.05) (0.70) 
      
Observations 29,511 252 25,878 341 3,825 
R-squared 0.040 0.233 0.035 0.189 0.049 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 6: Test of Signaling Motives 
This table presents the results of OLS regression tests for evaluating Signaling Reputation motives of the 
corporate charitable donation. Donation is the amount of donation identified from the article text. Cost of equity 
is the expected return estimated from Fama-French 3 factor model. Dispersion is the standard deviation of 
analysts’ earnings forecast for each specific year.  Donations with each respective topic only include samples 
with donations identified as those topics from the LDA analysis. Definition of financial variables is available in 
Appendix 1. Fixed effects are specified at firm level and industry-year level. All coefficients are standardized 
with standard deviations. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Forecast Dispersion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









      
Dispersion -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.043 -0.013 
 (-1.02) (-0.24) (-0.72) (-1.11) (-0.56) 
      
Log(asset) -0.020 -0.269** -0.019 0.108 -0.189*** 
 (-0.62) (-2.39) (-0.64) (0.45) (-3.04) 
Market Leverage -0.016 -0.931** -0.023 -0.324 0.052 
 (-0.75) (-2.56) (-1.02) (-1.20) (1.16) 
Tobin's q 0.051*** -0.246* 0.056*** -0.215*** -0.000 
 (4.64) (-2.02) (4.11) (-2.78) (-0.00) 
Investment 0.032*** -0.044 0.037*** -0.102 -0.076*** 
 (3.19) (-0.31) (3.18) (-1.21) (-3.55) 
Cash 0.023 -0.219* 0.034* -0.281** -0.029 
 (1.37) (-1.71) (1.78) (-2.07) (-1.08) 
ROA 0.004 -0.252 0.017 -0.128 -0.002 
 (0.20) (-0.77) (0.64) (-0.73) (-0.07) 
E Index -0.000 -0.124 0.000 0.052 -0.008 
 (-0.00) (-0.70) (0.00) (0.35) (-0.42) 
Constant 1.048** 9.704*** 0.995** 0.367 3.993*** 
 (1.97) (4.76) (1.99) (0.08) (3.91) 
      
Observations 97,944 739 85,607 1,045 12,499 
R-squared 0.049 0.185 0.050 0.171 0.060 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B: Cost of Equity      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









      
Cost of Equity 0.428** -0.014 0.020 -0.083 0.012 
 (2.01) (-0.36) (1.08) (-1.16) (0.43) 
      
Log(asset) 0.075 1.127*** -0.008 1.100*** 0.139* 
 (0.43) (7.96) (-0.27) (5.26) (1.86) 
Market Leverage 0.392 -1.135** 0.023 -1.374*** -0.027 
 (0.91) (-2.33) (1.14) (-6.11) (-0.54) 
Tobin's q 0.280*** -0.573*** 0.052*** -0.208** 0.127*** 
 (6.08) (-4.71) (4.59) (-2.13) (3.97) 
Investment 4.419*** 0.081 0.022* 0.236** 0.127*** 
 (3.32) (0.96) (1.70) (2.08) (5.03) 
Cash 1.102*** 0.342*** 0.031*** -0.050 0.034 
 (2.60) (4.85) (3.09) (-0.66) (0.92) 
ROA 0.105 -0.041 0.011 -0.635*** -0.058** 
 (0.13) (-0.36) (0.69) (-9.05) (-2.55) 
E Index -0.012 -0.718*** 0.003 -0.305* -0.054* 
 (-0.25) (-5.47) (0.32) (-1.74) (-1.88) 
Constant 1.921 -13.024*** 0.766* -11.081*** -1.085 
 (1.00) (-4.62) (1.88) (-3.84) (-1.01) 
      
Observations 98,315 733 86,112 1,038 12,590 
R-squared 0.051 0.201 0.053 0.172 0.065 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 7: Effects of Publicized Donations on Firm’s Financial Outcome 
This table presents the results of OLS regression tests for evaluating a firm-level financial outcome of the 
corporate charitable donation. Results for ROA, earnings forecast dispersion, cost of equity, and Tobin’s Q are 
presented in Panel A, B, C, and D, respectively. Donation is the amount of donation identified from the article 
text. ROA is return on asset that measures the profitability. Cost of equity is the expected return estimated from 
Fama-French 3 factor model. Dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast for each specific 
year.  Donations with each respective topic only include samples with donations identified as those topics from 
the LDA analysis. Definition of financial variables is available in Appendix 1. Fixed effects are specified at both 
firm and industry-year level. All coefficients are standardized with standard deviation. Numbers in parenthesis 
are t-statistics clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Dependent Variable:  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full Sample Altruism Managerial Community Publicity 
      
Donation 0.000 0.009** 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.35) (2.50) (1.51) (0.26) (-0.69) 
      
Log(asset) -0.132** -0.383 -0.142** -0.453*** -0.108 
 (-1.99) (-1.65) (-2.19) (-2.86) (-1.27) 
Tobin's q 0.370*** 0.248* 0.374*** 0.135 0.371*** 
 (5.09) (1.83) (5.09) (1.24) (4.90) 
Market Leverage -0.134 -0.722 -0.126 -0.590 -0.167 
 (-1.50) (-1.46) (-1.42) (-1.49) (-1.56) 
Cash -0.409*** -0.450*** -0.413*** -0.494*** -0.402*** 
 (-7.57) (-7.06) (-7.75) (-12.31) (-7.31) 
Investment 0.114*** 0.300*** 0.112*** 0.205*** 0.140*** 
 (2.98) (6.09) (2.92) (4.74) (3.61) 
E Index -0.033 -0.110 -0.032 -0.167** -0.033 
 (-0.97) (-1.39) (-0.97) (-2.25) (-0.87) 
Constant 3.382*** 9.557*** 3.503*** 9.992*** 3.079** 
 (3.19) (2.77) (3.35) (5.08) (2.36) 
      
Observations 102,249 760 89,555 1,082 13,085 
R-squared 0.967 0.989 0.968 0.984 0.969 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B: Dependent Variable: Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full Sample Altruism Managerial Community Publicity 
      
Donation -0.001* -0.054*** -0.001 -0.007 -0.000 
 (-1.67) (-2.96) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-0.86) 
      
Log(asset) 0.076 0.506*** 0.072 -0.115 0.085 
 (0.52) (4.18) (0.48) (-0.18) (0.54) 
Tobin's q -0.036 -0.023 -0.032 -0.072 -0.042 
 (-0.64) (-0.28) (-0.55) (-0.66) (-1.04) 
Market Leverage -0.141 0.035 -0.141 0.397 -0.080 
 (-1.40) (0.11) (-1.35) (1.40) (-0.88) 
Cash -0.212*** -0.210* -0.219*** -0.609*** -0.188** 
 (-3.19) (-1.91) (-3.33) (-4.35) (-2.56) 
Investment -0.189*** -0.429*** -0.187*** -0.488*** -0.219*** 
 (-5.74) (-6.52) (-6.63) (-6.92) (-2.64) 
ROA -0.360*** -1.099*** -0.373*** -1.123*** -0.326*** 
 (-3.51) (-6.10) (-3.73) (-8.43) (-3.25) 
E Index 0.104** 0.428*** 0.101* 0.551*** 0.133** 
 (2.02) (3.26) (1.96) (3.20) (2.59) 
      
Observations 97,735 739 85,630 1,045 12,490 
R-squared 0.897 0.903 0.897 0.893 0.919 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Cost of Equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full Sample Altruism Managerial Community Publicity 
      
Donation -0.000* 0.030** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.88) (2.26) (-1.04) (0.09) (-0.96) 
      
Log(asset) -0.114* -0.717*** -0.124* 0.174 -0.088 
 (-1.68) (-3.46) (-1.86) (0.64) (-0.93) 
Tobin's q -0.164*** -0.151 -0.164*** -0.170** -0.183*** 
 (-2.87) (-1.63) (-2.83) (-2.62) (-3.11) 
Market Leverage 0.017 0.724 0.022 0.270 0.023 
 (0.22) (1.33) (0.28) (0.83) (0.25) 
Cash -0.350*** -0.749*** -0.354*** -0.399*** -0.342*** 
 (-7.85) (-9.74) (-8.03) (-3.43) (-6.52) 
Investment -0.283*** -0.560*** -0.284*** -0.461*** -0.298*** 
 (-5.80) (-7.35) (-5.77) (-7.94) (-5.94) 
ROA 0.041 -0.326*** 0.040 -0.107 0.028 
 (1.56) (-3.13) (1.46) (-1.21) (0.86) 
E Index -0.065** -0.057 -0.061** -0.070 -0.102*** 
 (-2.29) (-0.32) (-2.21) (-0.84) (-2.78) 
      
Observations 98,315 733 86,112 1,038 12,590 
R-squared 0.949 0.950 0.948 0.945 0.953 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel D: Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full Sample Altruism Managerial Community Publicity 
      
Donation 0.002** -0.009* 0.001* -0.003 0.003** 
 (2.25) (-1.93) (1.85) (-1.10) (2.14) 
      
Log(asset) -0.003 0.085 -0.001 0.027 0.009 
 (-0.04) (0.38) (-0.01) (0.17) (0.11) 
Market Leverage -0.241** -0.903 -0.239** -0.914* -0.265** 
 (-2.46) (-1.54) (-2.47) (-1.98) (-2.25) 
Cash 0.127*** 0.116* 0.127*** 0.051 0.144*** 
 (4.32) (1.82) (4.29) (0.66) (4.31) 
Investment -0.265*** -0.395*** -0.267*** -0.337*** -0.278*** 
 (-3.38) (-5.21) (-3.39) (-6.79) (-3.93) 
ROA 0.391*** 0.344* 0.398*** 0.169 0.358*** 
 (8.60) (1.79) (8.72) (1.19) (7.63) 
E Index -0.064 -0.286 -0.065 -0.340** -0.062 
 (-0.98) (-1.67) (-0.99) (-2.08) (-0.94) 
Constant 1.936 2.884 1.904 4.357 1.856 
 (1.55) (0.59) (1.49) (1.35) (1.45) 
      
Observations 102,227 760 89,542 1,082 13,076 
R-squared 0.965 0.985 0.965 0.979 0.967 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











𝑤𝑖𝑗: 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑧𝑖𝑗: 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗
𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 
𝑁: 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝜃𝑖: 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 
𝑀: 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝛼: 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 










Appendix 2: Words used for Guidance Matrix 
Topic Words Included 
Altruism  
Food, low, income, hurricane, relief, disaster, civic, public, community, 
in-kind, in-kind, support, debt, emergency, equal, equity, ethics, 
sustainability, sustain, water, air, pollution, grantee, grassroot, 
nonprofit, non-profit, research, student, human, humane,  
Manager Benefit 
museum, ballet, art, culture, music, orchestra, sport, board 
infrastructure, university, education, endowment, exhibition, 
exhibitions, fiduciary, governance, faculty, fundraising, management, 
network, political, policy, institution, institutional, executive, CEO, 
CFO, chief, officer, officers, agency, foundation 
Local / Community 
employee, matching, grant, prosocial, gift, fund, volunteer, leadership, 
satisfaction, insider, internal, stakeholder, engagement, volunteerism, 
local, community, family, child, children, home, town, township, 
resident 
Publicity 
charitable, advocate, advocacy, campaign, award, prize, competition, 
conference, marketing, cause-related, external, stakeholder, 
presentation, press, media, fame, recognize, recognition, aware, 












Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Donation Variables 
Donation Logarithm of charitable donation publicized by news article released by the 
media in the given year scaled by the book value of total asset (AT) 
Corporate level Variable 
Market Leverage Book value of debt (DLTT+DLC) divided by the market value of total asset 
measured by calculating price close at annual fiscal year (PRCC_F) * Common 
Shares (CSHPRI) + Debt in current liability (DLC) + Long-term debt (DLTT) + 
Preferred stock (PSTKL) – Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit 
(TXDITC) 
Log(asset) Natural log of total book value asset of the firm  
Tobin's Q Price close at annual fiscal year (PRCC_F) * Common Shares (CSHPRI) + Debt 
in current liability (DLC) + Long-term debt (DLTT) + Preferred stock (PSTKL) 
– Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC) divided by the book 
value of total asset (AT) 
Cash Cash and cash equivalent (CHE) divided by the book value asset of the firm (AT) 
Total Dividend Dividend paid (DVT) for each fiscal year scaled by net income (NI) 
Investment Capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by the book value of total asset (AT)  
ROA Operating income after depreciation (OIADP) scaled by the book value of total 
asset (AT) 
Cost of Equity Fitted yearly expected return from Fama-French (1993) three factor model 
specification 
Forecast Dispersion Standard deviation of differences between analyst’s earnings forecast and 
realized earnings scaled by the absolute value of the mean consensus forecast. 
Data is obtained from IBES. 
E Index Entrenchment index defined in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), where a 
score of one is added if the company has practices of classified board, limit on 
ability to amend bylaw, limits on ability to amend charter, poison pill, golden 
parachute, and super-majority. 
HH Index Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated by sum of square of percentage market 
share represented in whole number by two-digit SIC level 
Market Share Sales of the company divided by the total sum of sales within two-digit SIC level 
industry 
CEO Age CEO’s age 
CEO Ownership Percentage ownership of common stock held scaled by total shares outstanding 
CEO Tenure The number of years the individual served as CEO 
CEO-chairman duality Indicator variable to indicate whether CEO of the company is also the chairman 
Board Size The number of directors in the board 
Female? Indicator variable for gender of the director 
Fraction of Independent 
Directors 
Percentage of independent director in the board 
 
